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may be hidden and, so to speak, covered up: The only 
thing left to do is to uncover it. But stating the problem 
is not simply uncovering, it is inventing.1 
 
Whether a problem is speculative, like the posing of 
a hypothesis, or embedded in an object as an actual 
or virtual construction (in a drawing, for example), it 
is the process of creation that is of interest here, and 
how that process is enabled by haecceities. Under-
standing problem creation as a working method2 
makes it possible for architects to make use of their 
practice-based skills in architectural research. 
Affect and Ethics 
Deleuze and Guattari present an understanding of 
individuation and haecceities as dynamic, producing 
relations between ethics and art,3 which co-produce 
affects. In Deleuze affect is a key notion, and has 
many connections with other concepts. Affect 
is a force that acts out in the way people live; in 
the life-world, with which architecture is inherently 
connected. Affect is also a force that is acted out 
on the drawing plane. It is the link between art and 
ethics: art as producing affects, and ethics as a way 
to live as affected by and affecting back a particu-
lar milieu.4 Affects, of course, do not only stem from 
art, in general affect can be said to drive behaviour.5 
Inspired by Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari propose 
the understanding of ethics as an ethology,6 which 
is the science of how humans and animals behave 
in their milieu. Ethics as ethology is a way to live, 
which is inter-related with affect.7 The connection 
between ethics, art and affects enables the emer-
Introduction
In this paper I will relate the notion haecceity or ‘this-
ness’ to architectural drawing, mapping and method 
in architectural practice-based research. The notion 
of haecceities connected to architectural drawing 
opens up an understanding of architectural drawing 
distinct from ‘merely’ representing built or buildable, 
optimized architectural space. That the architectural 
drawing represents building and space is inher-
ent, but, for the same reason, the architectural 
drawing’s power to produce space and building is 
sometimes diminished. Another obvious reason for 
understanding drawing as a capacity in its own right 
is that many architectural projects are never built, 
but live their life as drawings and produce a large 
effect and affect as such. They serve as inspiration, 
they teach, and are sometimes even canonized as 
pieces of art. The graphical formations in the archi-
tectural drawing, which ultimately produce space 
and building, belong to a space in its own capac-
ity, a space that supports the manifold processes 
of individuation. The haecceity of drawing makes it 
possible for these processes of individuation to take 
place. The productive properties of drawing can 
be exploited in design practice as well as practice-
based research, because the drawing enables us to 
create real problems:
The truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is 
a question of finding the problem and consequently of 
positing it, even more than of solving it. For a specula-
tive problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated. 
By that I mean that its solution exists then, although it 
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Analogue and Digital Notational Systems
In architectural practice and research today there 
is great interest in computational technology with 
two different aims: the one is to optimize building 
processes and enlarge the register of architectural 
construction; the other is to use the computer to 
produce spectacular, fascinating and surprising 
form. The computer has the capacity to simulate 
evolutionary processes found in nature, like the 
becoming of an anthill. While this is truly fascinating, 
rethinking the analogue and the digital may enable 
a fertile meeting between determinism and indeter-
minism in site-specific drawing. The analogue and 
the digital are opposites in the sense that digital 
means discontinuous and analogue means continu-
ous. A vinyl record is analogue. It has a continuous 
groove, an imprint, produced by physical sound 
waves. Like an ‘old-fashioned’ camera, which 
records light waves on film, analogue devices are 
able to record physical events, as opposed to digital 
devices, which depend on input from an analogue 
device translated into digital code.
 It is tempting to describe the computer as a 
determinate, digital machine, but because archi-
tectural computer programs have a user interface, 
which mimics working procedures traditionally 
done by hand, I think we can talk about ‘handmade 
computer drawing’,12 which then also contains the 
indeterminate. ‘Handmade computer drawing’ does 
not use the full potential of the computer as a calcu-
lator, but nevertheless benefits from some abilities 
of the computer. On the other hand, there is also 
hand drawing, which is strictly digital because it 
communicates via digital code. We usually under-
stand computer drawings as digital and hand 
drawings as analogue. In order to change this 
understanding and open up towards an already 
existing but less emphasized architectural prac-
tice of analogue and digital mixtures,13 we can 
separate the physical drawing tools from the more 
abstract graphical notational systems. The tools are 
typically the hand and the computer, and the nota-
gence of novel modes of creation,8 modes that 
are not subjugated to moral rules, but are directly 
engaged with living. Thus, affect is at stake both 
in drawing and in life. If we connect architectural 
drawing to this rhizome of concepts, we have an 
approach to drawing which does not stem from 
building, but concerns the drawing in itself, engaged 
with producing frames for life, both on the drawing 
plane and on the plane, which the drawing repre-
sents. 
 Inspired by Bergson, Deleuze elaborates a line 
of thought on evolution in which instinct is a means 
to act and an embodiment of thought. For instance, 
the eye is both a construction (a problem created) 
and the solution to a problem posed in terms of 
light,9 and therefore an embodiment of already 
organized thought. Intelligence, on the other hand, 
is the organization of thought. This line of thought 
can be seen in parallel to the multiple capacities of 
drawing. As both an act/activity and as an object in 
different states of transformation in time, drawing 
is well-known to enable the architect to organize 
thoughts and let instinct act. When drawing, the 
architect is confronted with what could be called the 
ethics of drawing: In order to draw, something must 
be drawn.10 This cannot happen without some kind 
of affect. The Deleuze and Guattarian concept of 
haecceities, which is at the heart of the connection 
between ethics and art,11 enables an understanding 
of architectural drawing as inevitably interrelated 
with life-worlds. Drawing, as both act and object, is 
directly connected to a here and now of life, and 
when drawing in relation to a site, the drawing is 
furthermore connected to the life of that site. The 
drawing’s haecceity is the simple fact that the 
drawing is there – either as a piece of paper or a 
file in the computer – as a plane for the architect to 
work upon and to affect in a process of individua-
tion. On the one hand, life unfolds on the drawing 
plane, it populates and individuates the drawing; on 
the other, life unfolds on the plane of a site. 
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Fig. 1: Points, lines, life
Fig. 2: Diagram of connections which meet in drawing
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tion of a relative, topological kind (digital).20 As in 
roadmaps, analogue and digital notational systems 
mix in architectural drawing, which is able to repre-
sent both kinds of information. Projective, analogue 
information, like tracings of the earth’s contours, 
and digital information, like measurements and 
topological relations. 
 It seems meaningful to talk about digital and 
analogue notational systems rather than notational 
or non-notational systems, like Goodman does. We 
can still use Goodman’s definitions of the analogue 
and the digital, but instead of seeking to separate 
them; it could be more fruitful to see these appar-
ent oppositions as interrelated and interdependent. 
As graphical formations the notational systems 
are used to both unify and retain differences of 
analogue and digital kind in the same drawing. 
This move can be seen as a ‘Deleuzefication’ of 
Goodman, because Deleuze (inspired by Bergson) 
presents an approach to the world, where the world 
is a multiplicity of orders that are distinguished by 
difference, rather than by negation.21 A negation 
involves a general idea of less and a more22 and 
implies hierarchy instead of juxtaposition.
 I agree with Goodman that diagrams can 
engage both the digital and the analogue,23 but 
that an architectural plan is a ‘digital diagram’,24 
as Goodman hesitatingly concludes, is too narrow 
a definition. It is rather simply a diagram with both 
analogue and digital information. Goodman himself 
has difficulties categorizing the ‘mixed and transi-
tional case’25 of architecture, but concludes that 
architecture is prevalently allographic, because 
elements and measurements in the architectural 
drawing mostly indicate relative location, and not 
location in a continuum. Drawings of a house are 
digital because elements in the drawing comply 
with elements in the house, and, in principle, the 
house can be placed anywhere.26 The mapping and 
the site plan, however, are good examples of the 
opposite, namely that situatedness and location are 
tional systems are the graphical systems used to 
put down configurations in the drawing. Obviously, 
the hand is an analogue tool, and the computer is 
a digital tool. But no matter if we deal with hand or 
computer drawing, analogue and digital notational 
systems are used. In Languages of Art, Nelson 
Goodman investigates the symbol systems of differ-
ent art forms and their amenability to a notational 
system. He proposes that if an art form is amenable 
to a notational system, it is digital, notational and 
allographic,14 whereas if it is not, it is analogue, non-
notational and autographic. Basically, Goodman 
uses the two categories as means to determine 
authorship:15 Painting, for example, is non-nota-
tional and is only regarded to be original when a 
direct connection to the author can be traced; hence 
painting is an autographic art form. Music, on the 
other hand, is amenable to a notational system, and 
a piece of music is original as an instance of a work, 
hence music is an allographic art form.16 Both digital 
and analogue systems should have meaning and 
should not be redundant.17 But the meaning of an 
analogue system is related to a physical event in a 
continuum, whereas meaning in a digital system is 
relative. Objects such as a seismograph, a counter, 
and a watch make use of an analogue, a digital, 
and a mixed system, respectively.18 A seismograph 
measures the trembling of the earth, and the graph 
produced by a seismograph is directly connected to 
a physical event, and therefore analogue. A counter 
counts and is in a relative relation to that which it 
counts, like a cash register, and is therefore digital. 
A watch is also counting, but is read in relation to 
how long a day lasts, not to the beginning of all time. 
The lasting of a day, however, is determined by the 
position and rotation of the earth and the sun, which 
is a physical connection that describes a location 
in a continuum, and because the watch is both 
counting in a relative relation (the lasting of a day) 
and in an absolute relation (the globe’s location in 
a continuum), it is a mixed case. The same goes 
for roadmaps,19 because they contain information 
of the land they represent (analogue), and informa-
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Fig. 3: Analogue system for storing sound (top), close up of record groove (bottom)
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Deleuze and Guattari draw on Scotus, Spinoza and 
Bergson33 when linking haecceities, art and ethics. 
In order to shed some more light on what the role 
of haecceities is, I will unfold the concept intensity, 
which plays a parallel but not completely similar 
role.34 Intensity can be traced back to Deleuze’s elab-
oration of Bergson’s conceptualization of time and 
space.35 Originally, Bergson distinguishes between 
time, or duration as he calls it, as that which divides 
only by changing in kind,36 whereas space is divided 
by changing in degree. When dividing space, which 
in Bergson is defined as an objective quantity, 
we find equivalence between the divided and the 
number of divisions.37 A change in kind, on the other 
hand, is caused by a subjective, qualitative differ-
ence, which is ‘susceptible to measurement only by 
varying its metrical principle at each stage of the 
division.’38 In Bergson, time or duration presents the 
‘right side’, because Bergson thinks of space as a 
mere location for duration, whereas duration is that 
which spawns qualitative differences and changes.39
Take a lump of sugar: It has a spatial configuration. 
But if we approach it from that angle, all we will ever 
grasp are differences in degree between that sugar 
and any other thing. But it also has a duration, a 
rhythm of duration, a way of being in time that is at 
least partially revealed in the process of its dissolving, 
and that shows how this sugar differs in kind not only 
from other things, but first of all from itself. This altera-
tion, which is one with the essence or the substance 
of a thing, is what we grasp when we conceive it in 
terms of Duration.40 
The sugar is conceived both as a ‘mere’ spatial 
object that can be described in terms of external 
measurements, and as a piece of matter, which 
enables a change of state caused by intensive differ-
ences. Deleuze turns Bergson’s distinction between 
differences in kind and differences in degree into an 
interrelationship between the two. He observes that 
Bergson himself indirectly claims that differences 
ultimately occur by virtue of intensity of contraction 
factors that affect architecture. That the digital is 
non-situated or generic in character is a tendency 
often seen in designs that are bred strictly in digital, 
generic environments. An understanding of the 
analogue and the digital as distinct but interdepend-
ent notions may open up for a way to approach a 
site, and create a meeting between digital, generic 
production and analogue, non-generic, milieus. 
This meeting could advantageously take place in 
drawing, which has a transversal capacity to make 
use of both analogue and digital tools and nota-
tional systems, no matter if it is made with pen, ruler 
and set square or computer scripting.
Haecceity
Haecceity is the becoming individual from having 
been undifferentiated.27 It is something very 
concrete, a thisness, like a drawing, and describes 
a process of individuation, like when drawing. 
Etymologically speaking, an haecceity is a thisness 
(from the Latin haec). The idea is that among the prop-
erties of an object, there is the property of being that 
very object.28
[A haecceity is] the quality implied in the use of this, 
as this man; ‘thisness’; ‘hereness and nowness’; that 
quality or mode of being in virtue of which a thing is or 
becomes a definite individual; individuality.29 
The concept stems from the medieval philosopher 
John Duns Scotus,30 and is further elaborated by 
Deleuze and Guattari,31 who use it to describe a 
change between states, the becoming individual 
by becoming different from what was before in a 
process of change or division. To them haecceities 
regard almost anything, not just objects and subjects. 
A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have 
a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though 
this individuality is different from that of a thing or a 
subject. They are haecceities … capacities to affect 
and be affected.32
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Fig. 4: Digital system for storing sound, musical box
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Fig. 5: Captions from the top down:
1: Dismantling the Mercator world map its analogue information: 2: Projective manipulation of the drawing plane: 45 
degrees rotation of time zones: 3: Another Pangaea.
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Fig. 6: Captions from the top down:
1: Digital information: Degrees, latitudes, longitudes and time zone systems: 2: Projective manipulation of counting 
systems: 3: A new intensity.
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should live in accordance with ‘that which agrees 
with our nature or does not agree with it’.47 On the 
one hand, this is an unclear guideline, because 
who is to judge what agrees with our nature? On 
the other hand, this approach gives resistance to 
conventions. Ethics holds a connection to instinc-
tive acting in life in accordance with sense and 
affect, and poses questions such as: ‘What can a 
body do?’48. This relates to art, because, firstly, art 
creates affects, and, secondly, art ‘can create the 
consistency necessary to understand interrelations 
that are real but difficult to conceive’ by putting 
things together that are ‘only apparently incom-
patible (and that are in fact connected)’.49 So, we 
have the opening question ‘What can a body do?’, 
and to prevent the answer from being ‘everything’ 
(complete relativism), we have a situated milieu, 
which affects behaviour in a certain direction. In 
nature organisms, animals and plants act in accord-
ance with their milieu, not due to intelligence but 
due to instinct.50 Bergson understands instinct to be 
knowledge of matter, an ‘acting on things’, a kind 
of thought which has already been organized and 
embodied, like we see in the body forms of living 
beings. Intelligence, on the other hand, is knowl-
edge of form, an ‘organizing of thought’.51 Thought, 
organized or not, ‘allows for the development of 
instruments which will serve to effect the environ-
ment in a certain way’.52
 Bergson’s ideas sketch out a methodical 
approach in architectural practice-based research, 
because the organization of thought and the acting 
out of instinct can be a method to develop concrete 
tools, objects, techniques, technologies, as well 
as to motivate a way of conducting research with 
architectural tools, such as a ruler, a set-square, the 
hand and the computer, as ‘body extensions’ with 
properties embedded in them.
or relaxation. Thereby Deleuze gathers that it is 
ultimately a question of interrelation between time 
and space in terms of intensity, and not a clear-cut 
distinction, but rather a fluent transition between the 
two.41 By observing this, Deleuze changes Berg-
son’s original distinctions between kind/time and 
space/degree into an interrelationship of intensi-
ties and extensities, where intensive processes 
produce the extensive form.42 A haecceity makes 
a meeting possible where an alteration of intensity 
can be produced. Like a fractal, this process may 
potentially happen again and again in all kinds of 
different connections. Intensities, then, as ‘drivers 
of’ dynamic processes of evolution, such as embry-
ogenesis,43 produce not only the measurable world, 
but are also co-producers of affect and sensation.44
What, in fact, is a sensation? It is the operation 
of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a recep-
tive surface. Quality emerges from this, quality that 
is nothing other than contracted quantity. This is 
how the notion of contraction (or of tension) allows 
us to go beyond the duality of homogeneous quan-
tity and heterogeneous quality, and to pass from 
one to the other in a continuous movement.45 
The notion of affects and sensations, which are 
caused by intensities, haecceities and processes 
of individuation, is the link between ethics and art, 
because, in understanding ethics as an ethology, 
life is a product of affecting and being affected in 
a milieu,46 both with instinctive, bodily acting and 
organizing, ‘mindly’ thoughts.
Ethics and the Production of Affect
Because haecceities enable the production of affect 
and are produced by affect, they open up a kind 
of creation, which does not follow moral rules, but 
ethical ones. Ethics is distinguished from moral 
in the sense that moral is concerned with rules to 
govern the behaviour of the body, and with determin-
ing categories of ‘Good and Evil’, whereas ethics is 
concerned with ‘good and bad’ in the sense that we 
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Fig. 7: Scanimation of the changes in the Berlin street net from 1945 until 2010. A scanimation is a technique, known 
from children’s books, which can show changes over time. It is an interesting representational form because it can mix 
analogue and digital notation and information. In order for the scanimation to work properly, a transparent piece of folio 
with black stripes corresponding to the stripes in the drawing should be slid over a drawing like the one shown here.
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we do not know to be true, these facts would arrange 
themselves luminously. That is abduction.58 
Apart from the assumption of truth, which is diffi-
cult to apply to architectural design, the process 
described here is one of creation and invention. 
That facts, thoughts and lines eventually ‘arrange 
themselves luminously’, when working intensely 
with a certain material, is a well-known phenom-
enon in the architectural drawing process. 
Drawing and Haecceity
What takes place in architectural drawing can both 
be understood as the creation of a problem and 
as an ever-emerging posing of hypotheses, which 
succeed and overwrite each other. In drawing these 
processes are in discussion with a material consist-
ing of both facts and fiction, and are put down by 
means of physical tools, materials and notational 
systems. Architectural drawing taps into the gener-
ative, explorative and epistemological resources 
of art, where new relations between objects and 
concepts are created by arranging and composing 
a material. As a methodical way of orchestrating 
instinct and intelligence, drawing enables the crea-
tion of a problem, and can contain a problem and 
a solution to it. And as an activity conducted over 
time and an object in a process of transformation, 
drawing is many simultaneous processes of indi-
viduation. In a very basic way, drawing is a state of 
simultaneously doing, being and representing. On 
the one hand, the drawing takes place here and now 
and refers only to itself. It is concrete and present. 
On the other, the drawing represents something 
else, and is an actualizing field where differences 
are grown.59 Architectural drawings function as 
epistemic objects60 in concrete form, which enable 
exchanges between real and imagined worlds in 
symbiosis with notational systems and physical 
tools. In its manifold capacity the drawing makes it 
possible to negotiate with the world at a distance 
and to let new worlds emerge at the same time, 
clarifying processes of thought and producing 
Intuition and Abduction
In Bergson instinct and intuition go hand in hand, 
and his intuitive method seeks to crack a hole in 
conventions and make way for novelty to emerge. 
There are things that intelligence alone is able 
to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. 
These things instinct alone could find; but it 
will never seek them.’53 (emphasis in original).
Charles Sanders Peirce describes something 
similar under the title abduction or hypothesis (later 
retroduction). Abduction, as opposed to intuition, 
is related to ‘traditional science’, as the first stage 
of a scientific process, the posing of a hypothesis: 
the construction of a qualified guess. In Peirce logic 
marks the scientific process, and because there is 
logic behind abduction, it is a method in line with 
induction and deduction. The posing of a hypothesis 
obviously bears some similarities with the creation of 
a problem. As opposed to Karl Popper, who thought 
that the posing of a hypothesis was unscientific,54 
Peirce thought that abduction describes a logical, 
systematic inference. He thought of abduction as 
being simultaneously the ‘highest’ and the ‘lowest’ 
class of inference.55 Low, because the logic behind 
abduction is vague, and high, because, as opposed 
to induction and deduction, abduction is the only kind 
of inference that can open up new ground.56 Abduc-
tion is low on security, but high on uberty, richness or 
fruitfulness, and has a tendency to be affirmative.57
 
A mass of facts is before us. We go through them. 
We examine them. We find them a confused snarl, 
an impenetrable jungle. We are unable to hold them 
in our minds. We endeavor to set them down upon 
paper; but they seem so multiplex intricate that we 
can neither satisfy ourselves that what we have set 
down represents the facts, nor can we get any clear 
idea of what it is that we have set down. But suddenly, 
while we are poring over our digest of the facts and 
are endeavoring to set them into order, it occurs to us 
that if we were to assume something to be true that 
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Fig. 8:  Work in progress: Writing, mapping and cutting up the urban tissue, Berlin Mitte
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our environment. Even if maps are fact-based, they 
are artificial and non-objective, both because of the 
situated cultural context of the mapper, and because 
of the techniques of cartography (mathematical 
formulas) that are used to project the curved and 
three-dimensional ground conditions onto a two-
dimensional, flat surface (which doesn’t mean that 
maps or drawings have to be two-dimensional66). 
The cartography’s projection distorts the one or 
the other aspect of the depicted ground condi-
tions. This distortion becomes very obvious when 
it comes to world maps, because their purpose is 
to show the whole, round globe unfolded at once.67 
When zooming in on a piece of the globe, a city 
for example, the distortion becomes smaller, but the 
image that the map gives is still a selection. Hence, 
when we examine maps of the earth as architec-
tural drawings, their ‘double-sided’ character68 
and artificiality becomes a property to exploit. The 
mapping receives information from two sides: from 
the physical surface, which the map represents, 
and from the working surface of the mapper.69 Even 
if mapping (especially master planning, which has 
a bad imperialist sound to it) is often considered 
to be a ‘top-down’ practice, it is really something 
which, again, is in the middle, right there where ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ meet. Or at least it can be. 
As drawings, maps represent life-worlds, and like 
an exploratorium that investigates how bodies can 
behave and how they are limited, mappings make 
it possible to scrutinize the connection between 
behaviour and the different processes of affect that 
produce a certain milieu. 
A Mapping Strategy
Then, what should be mapped? Is it possible for a 
‘loose fit’ between the determinate and indetermi-
nate to emerge by mapping a piece of contemporary 
urbanity? 
 Goodman mentions a composition by John Cage 
[fig. 13], which he calls an ‘autograph diagram’. In 
contrast to traditional musical scores, which are 
architectural space while communicating it. The 
haecceity of architectural drawing is at the heart of 
drawing’s methodical function in both design and 
research practice. Drawing works in both practices 
to drive a process forward, and is not only a piece of 
‘material evidence’. Just as drawing can coproduce 
architectural objects it can coproduce architectural 
thoughts, and when the two hold a part of each 
other we have a situation of reciprocal pollination 
between design and research practice.
Mapping and Haecceity
Architectural mapping is a meeting point between 
life-worlds and ethics. Maps of cities and maps of 
the globe obviously represent life-worlds; they can 
express both fact and fiction.61 Maps can repre-
sent the ‘real world’, like a projection of the curved 
surface of the earth onto a flat drawing plane, or 
a ‘fictive world’. In both cases, though, maps are 
constructed and artificial,62 they are not that which 
they represent, but as exploratoriums they enable 
a meeting between the real and the fictive. Exactly 
by being different from that which it represents, a 
mapping is an exploratorium for the emergence of 
new possible worlds.63 Because mappings have a 
contact-surface with the life-world they represent, 
as a potential plan of action, and a contact-surface 
with the ‘here and now’, as concrete objects, they 
are able to be affected by life and affect back life 
more obviously than a detail drawing, for example 
(although a detail can have a large impact on life as 
something well or poorly working, maps are grounds 
for playing out scenarios). Apart from helping us 
orientate and navigate in the world, maps are tools 
for dividing up the world and for making decisions; 
they can have a strategic function, for example 
when used in military campaigns.64 
 Along with being strategic tools (to overlook 
information from the top down), maps are selected 
projections of actual ground conditions onto a 
surface65 (a way to receive information from the 
bottom and up), which depicts chosen aspects of 
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Fig. 9:   Diderot’s Encyclopedia: Art Militaire, Evolutions
Fig. 10: Diderot’s Encyclopedia: Art Militaire, Evolutions
Fig. 10Fig. 9
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Fig. 11: Work in progress: Quantitative mapping of Berlin Playgrounds. The ones with a purple dot emerged due to dam-
age on buildings caused by bombings in the Second World War.
Fig. 12: Work in progress: Qualitative mapping of Berlin building typology.
Fig. 11
Fig. 12
53
Fig. 13: John Cage, musical notation, taken from: Nelson Goodman, “Languages of Art” p. 188. “Concert for Piano and 
Orchestra, Solo for Piano” (NewYork, Henmar Press, Inc., 1969), p. 53, figure BB. Redrawn by the author
Fig. 14: John Cage composition with guidelines made graphically visible by the author. 
Fig. 13
Fig. 14
54
Conclusion
It may seem like a lot to ascribe to drawing the 
ability to intervene with the way that we live, but 
the drawing does this in at least two ways: drawing 
works with affect in the sense that in the process 
of drawing we are affected by it and affect it back. 
Thereby the drawing is in a constant process of 
individuation, or of being continuously produced 
anew, it differs both from itself and from other 
things, like Bergson’s lump of sugar. This is a 
sensuous property, which calls attention to the 
drawing’s doubleness of being in contact with the 
here-and-now and with that ‘something else’ that it 
both represents and produces. And, because there 
is a difference between the drawing itself and that 
which it represents, drawing enables us to experi-
ment with the represented and thus we can arrange 
and compose registers for action that could not 
be proposed and eventually tested otherwise. The 
extensive world is represented in our drawings as 
depictions of existing buildings, cities, etcetera and, 
simultaneously, the graphical configurations on 
the drawing plane calls forth intensive affects and 
fosters sensuous inferences. In yet another way, the 
drawing represents architectural space as a plan of 
action, and when this plan is put into effect, it affects 
our lives. In drawing we find a mixture of instinct/
intuition and intelligence, which interacts and binds 
together the extensive, measurable world, and the 
intensive, sensuous world, facts and fiction.
So haecceity provides a means of determining an 
individuation which, at the same time, maps a differ-
entiation and unity of being.72
Notes
1.  Here Deleuze quotes Bergson (Henri Bergson, The 
Creative Mind, 58-59 (1293, 51-52), Translated by 
Mabelle L. Andison, Westport, Conneticut: Green-
wood Press, 1946. La pensée et le Mouvant, 1941) 
in Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. by Hugh Tomlin-
son and Barbara Habberiam, (New York: Zone Books, 
digital and allographic in Goodman, this composition 
is open to interpretation to an extent that makes it 
impossible to distinguish whether it is the same piece 
we are listening to every time it is played. Hence, 
in Goodman’s definition it is analogue and auto-
graphic.70 I think, however, that the piece is a nice 
example of a mapping in between the deterministic 
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